T THE analogies which ethics and political science may bear to the natural sciences, as well as the analogies of moral and political actions to artistic and technical productions, are prominent in the first discussions of virtue and political institutions. The early formulations of those likenesses lay the pattern for efforts, much repeated subsequently, to make morals and politics more certain by imitation of the methods of science or, conversely, to make science more practical and moral action more efficient by relating them to principles of operation suggested by the arts and crafts. As Aristotle tells the story, Socrates, the first philosopher to concern himself with problems of scientific method, applied his speculations on method to morals rather than the natural sciences, while Plato continued Socrates' interest in universals or definitions but, unlike Socrates, gave universals separate existence.' In Plato's presentation of the philosophic inquiry of Socrates, this search for definitions, which he shared with Socrates, leads to the development of a method of inquiry which proceeds by analogies of virtue with the arts-of the just, brave, temperate, or wise man with the cobbler, shipbuilder, physician, farmer, IMetaphysics i. 6. 987b: 'Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions." Cf. ibid. xiii. 4. I078bI7 if. and 9. io86b2. 253 Reproduced with permission of the University of Chicago Press. For personal, noncommercial use only.
5 Nicomachean Ethics ii. 5. I I05a27: "Again, the case of the arts and that of the virtues is not similar; for the products of the arts have their goodness in themselves, so that it is enough that they should have a certain character, but if the acts, that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or temperately. The agent must also be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character. These are not reckoned in as conditions of the possession of the arts, except the bare knowledge; but as a condition of the possession of the virtues knowledge has little or no weight, while the other conditions count not for a little but for everything, i.e. the very conditions which result from often doing just and temperate acts." Cf. ibid. vi. 4. II40aI ff.; II40a33 ff., esp. II4ob2I: "But further, while there is such a thing as excellence in art, there is no such thing as excellence in prudence; and in art he who errs willingly is preferable, but in prudence as in the virtues, he is the like prudence or any other intellectual virtue, is produced and destroyed, as are the moral virtues, but unlike them it is acquired by teaching, not by habituation. 6 Plato preserved Socrates' analogy of virtue to the arts and to knowledge, but added to it, since knowledge is of being as opinion is of becoming, an existential status for the subject of this knowledge. Aristotle's criticism broke the development of the Platonic doctrine into two stages, separating the analogy of the virtues to knowledge from the analogy of the Good to Being, and while Aristotle continued to make use of both analogies, he derived opposite conclusions from each. Socrates' comparison of virtue and the arts, according to Aristotle, made them both kinds of knowledge; Aristotle's comparison of the two emphasized rather their status in being-both are habits to be acquired, not natural entities, and the further contrast he drew between the virtues and the arts distinguished them precisely in the greater dependence of art on knowledge.7 Plato's identification of the Good with Being, according to Aristotle, is the result of an inference from knowledge which is changeless to reverse. Plainly then, prudence is a virtue and not an art." Cf. also ibid. I3. II44bI7 ff., esp. 30: "It is clear, then, from what has been said, that it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without prudence, nor prudent without moral virtue." 7 Habit is contrasted both to nature and to reason as a possible mode of acquiring virtue. Ibid. ii. I. II03ai8: "From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature ... . Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit." Cf. ibid. iii. 3. III2a3I and x. 9. II79b20: "Now some think that we are made good by nature, others by habituation, others by teaching." We are not made good by nature, and therefore consideration of nature is not important in ethics; but we are adapted to virtue by nature, and therefore in politics both nature and the rational principle are joined to habit in the treatment of virtue. Cf. Politics vii. I3. I332a39: "There are three things that make men good and virtuous; these are nature, habit, rational principle. .... We have already determined what natures are likely to be most easily moulded by the hands of the legislator. All else is the work of education; we learn some things by habit and some by instruction." Cf. ibid. I5. I334b6 and I7. I336b40: "The poets who divide ages by sevens are in the main right: but we should observe the divisions actually made by nature; for the deficiencies of nature are what art and education seek to fill up." 258 ETHICS an eternal subject matter. Aristotle's comparison of morals and politics with scientific knowledge, brought out, not an identity of subject matter in the practical and theoretic sciences, but a similarity of principles, for the analysis by which the moralist arrives at principles is like the analysis of the mathematician, while the process by which art or morals operates from the principle is like the processes of physics. The comparison of the practical with the theoretic sciences, however, must be supplemented by a distinction, since the direction of analysis and action in politics is different from the establishment of principles and the direction of demonstration in either mathematics or physics, the hypotheses which serve as principles in mathematics being supplanted by final causes in ethics, and the efficient cause of the process in morals becoming an idea in the mind of the agent.8 In the place of the being suggested for the Good by 8 Nicomachean Ethics vii. 9. I I5a I5: "For virtue and vice respectively preserve and destroy the first principle, and in actions the final cause is the first principle, as the hypotheses are in mathematics; neither in that case is it the argument that teaches the first principles, nor is it so here-virtue either natural or produced by habituation is what teaches right opinion about the first principle." Ibid. iii. 3. III2bI2: "'We deliberate not about ends but about means. For a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, nor does anyone else deliberate about his end. They assume the end and consider how and by what means it is to be attained: and if it seems to be produced by several means, they consider by which it is most easily and best produced, while if it is achieved by one only they consider how it will be achieved by this and by what means this will be achieved, till they come to the first cause, which in the order of discovery is last. For the person who deliberates seems to investigate and analyse in the way described as though he were analysing a geometrical construction (not all investigation appears to be deliberation-for instance mathematical investigations-but all deliberation is investigation), and what is last in the order of analysis seems to be first in the order of becoming." Cf. ibid. i. 7. iog8a39 and Metaphysics vii. 7. I032b22: "The active principle then and the starting-point for the process of becoming healthy is, if it happens by art, the form in the soul, and if spontaneously, it is that, whatever it is, which is the starting-point of his making for the man who makes by art, as in healing the starting-point is perhaps the production of warmth, and this the physician produces by rubbing." The practical sciences are compared with the arts and the theoretic sciences in the use of principles; they are contrasted to both in their ends. Cf. above, n. 4, and Nickomackean Ethics ii. 2. II03b26: "Since, then, the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others (for we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use), we must examine the nature of actions, namely how we ought to do them; for these determine also the the analogy of science, Aristotle found a status of becoming for virtue through its analogy to art; in the place of knowledge and principles of knowledge suggested as the nature of virtue by the analogy of the arts, Aristotle found a principle of action in the practical sciences through their analogy to the theoretic sciences.
The meticulous concern of Aristotle to treat of the doctrines of his predecessors, and even to rearrange and preserve in his own analysis pieces of them, not always easily recognizable as such, his recurrence to the analogy of the virtues and the arts, and his emphasis on the distinction of the practical from the theoretical and the productive sciences, should not be permitted to conceal the scientific insights in which these formal interests originate or the practical consequences which they entail. Ethics and politics are comparable in method with the theoretic sciences, but in the practical sciences, since their end is action, the method is itself part of the subject matter. The importance of action in ethics and politics is comparable to the importance of production in the arts, but the emphasis is on the product in the arts and only secondarily on the state of mind which may be inferred as its cause, while the emphasis in morals is on habit, character, and intention, and only when they have been taken into account can the action which results from them be judged, since it may often, under other circumstances, have followed from morally indifferent conditions. Method and subject matter may, therefore, be distinguished analytically in ethics and in the arts, in the sense that the method in each is directed to action or production while the subject matter consists of the entities involved in either process. In the theoretic sciences they are contrasted without danger of confusion, since the things known are prior to and apart from nature of the states of character that are produced, as we have said." Ibid. x. 9. II79a35: "Surely, as the saying goes, where there are things to be done the end is not to survey and recognize the various things, but rather to do them; with regard to virtue, then, it is not enough to know, but we must try to have and use it, or try any other way there may be of becoming good." 260 ETHICS the study of them, and the formal analysis and demonstration of knowledge, which constitutes method, is employed on a natural or abstract subject matter whose conditions of existence are independent of the requirements or influence of knowledge. Within the more limited range of actions and products, moreover, virtues and institutions, which form the subject matter of political philosophy, may be contrasted in their mode of existence to artificial objects, which form the subject matter of art, notwithstanding the similarity of their genesis, in much the fashion that the analytic processes of mathematics are opposed to the physical processes of natural philosophy. When Aristotle analogizes art and politics to the theoretic sciences, he uses examples from the arts and from the physical sciences, sometimes to clarify art by analyses from physics, sometimes to clarify distinctions in physics by analysis of the arts; political institutions and moral habits, on the other hand, usually suggest mathematical principles rather than physical phenomena. The objects of art are produced as nature would have produced them, and both in the processes of production and in the objects produced, art imitates nature.9 As process and as analytical method the greater clarity in these analogies lies on the side of art, for it is possible to distinguish ends and necessary conditions clearly in the arts (since the end is in the mind of the artist, the conditions in his materials), whereas in nature they are only the successive stages of a process continuous in time: Aristotle thus usually distinguishes form and matter or the four causes in physics or metaphysics by isolating them in the example of the builder and his house or the sculptor and his statue.'0 As "Political revolutions also spring from a disproportionate increase in any part of the state. For as a body is made up of many members, and every member ought to grow in proportion, that symmetry may be preserved; but loses its nature if the foot be four cubits long and the rest of the body two spans; and, should the abnormal increase be one of quality as well as of quantity, may even take the form of another animal: even so a state has many parts, of which some one may often grow imperceptibly; for example, the number of poor in democracies and in constitutional states"; ibid. viii. Final causes in the practical sciences are comparable to hypotheses in mathematics (ibid. vii. 9. II5IaI5). Indeed, the distinction is reproduced in the hypotheses of mathematics, some of which are concerned with the meanings of terms, some with existence (cf. Posterior Analytics i.
a,,).
14 Nicomachean Ethics vi. 4. I140aI; Vii. 12. II53a23: "The fact that no pleasure is the product of any art arises naturally enough: there is no art of any other activity either, but only of the corresponding faculty; though for that matter the arts of the perfumer and the cook are thought to be arts of pleasure." Politics ii. 8. i268b35: "Such changes in the other arts and sciences have certainly been beneficial; medicine, for example, and gymnastic, and every other art and craft have departed from traditional usage. And, if politics be an art, change must be necessary in this as in any other art .
The analogy of the arts is false; a change in a law is a very different thing from a change in an art." Cf. the treatment of art in education, ibid. viii. 5. 1339811. Conversely, consideration of the virtues and of political institutions may be useful in the arts of rhetoric and poetic (cf. Rhetoric i. 8-9. 1365b22 ff., and Poetics 25. 146i94).
Is Rhetoric i. 2. I356a25; Nicomachean Ethics x. 9. IIS8Ia3. serving first principles (comparable to the first principles used in mathematics) and also themselves the chief subject matter of the practical science (comparable to the natures studied in physics). The subject matter of ethics is unlike that of mathematics since it is not abstract; it is unlike that of physics since it is not fixed by "natural" properties or "natural" movements. Yet the method of ethics is like that of mathematics in the use made of principles, although moral inferences proceed from final causes, not from antecedent hypotheses. It is like the method of physics, since both inquire into antecedent conditions of motions and changes or into the ends in which they eventuate if unhindered. The subject matter of such inquiry in physics is natural motion and change; the properties, functions, and changes of a thing are therefore sought in terms of its definition, its end, or its matter. Virtues, actions, and institutions on the contrary are inaugurated in politics and ethicsas artificial things and motions are produced in art-by acquired skills and habits which utilize existent situations as antecedents to ends not yet accomplished.
Virtues, actions, and institutions cannot be explained by things alone or by natures, as natural motions are explained in physics, for they originate from habits, not from natural powers. Neither the habit nor the action which results from it is susceptible of exact scientific definition; what is done is guided by precepts, commands, and rational rules, and these determine the form and, therefore, the definition of the virtues. Since the method of the practical sciences is directed to operation, while the method of the theoretic sciences is directed to knowledge, the artist and the moral agent use actual situations to achieve possible ends, instead of inspecting, as the physical scientist does, actual natures and ends to infer necessary antecedents. Like physical changes, moral actions must be understood from the material potentialities they realize and the purposes they achieve, that is, from their necessity and their ends. Nature is encountered in political and moral problems at two extremes, 264 ETHICS in the "natural" passions and powers of individual men and in the "natural" associations which are essential to life and the ends of living. The proper subject matter of political and moral philosophy is to be found, between these two manifestations of nature, in actions and more particularly in habituations and institutions which result from actions and which in turn determine actions. Happiness and the virtues are functions both of the potentialities found in the individual and of the institutions which are brought to bear on the actualization of those potentialities in family, social relations, and state. Happiness and virtue are acquired; they are not the gift of nature, providence, or chance, nor are they imparted by teaching or acquired by learning, although their acquisition is often influenced by the effects of inclination, fortune, or precept; happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, and the virtues are habits formed through performance of actions like those which are in turn consequent on virtue.
These differences between the practical and theoretic-sciences in method and subject matter remove the possibility of a sharp separation of kinds in the practical sciences such as is characteristic of the theoretic sciences in the Aristotelian philosophy, for the precept that there is a science for each genus of things does not apply to habits, actions, and institutions, which cannot be separated and defined like the substances and motions studied in physics. The principles set up in the practical sciences are not rendered relevant or effective by consideration of natures alone, and the method is dialectical as contrasted to the strictly scientific method of the theoretic sciences. Ethics and politics are not separate sciences treating of independent subject matters, but are dialectically distinct approaches to common problems, and in each approach the effect of the other must be taken into account. Although they are properly considered in terms of the capacities and potentialities of individual men, moral actions nonetheless reflect the influences exercised on men by social groups and by political states. Although they are prop-erly considered in terms of the ends of communal life, social aims are nonetheless conditioned in their practicability by the characteristics of the individuals who participate in the group. The state is one of the determining influences in ethical considerations, and conversely the solution of political problems would be indeterminate and utopian without consideration of the character, occupations, and material environment of citizens. The two considerations may on occasion be distinct and antithetical rather than complementary, for the moral characters of citizens may be hindrances to, as they are also materials for, the political aims of a state; and the political constitution may either systematize or disrupt the forces in a state which operate toward the acquisition of virtues and the ends of moral aspiration. Laws may aid men to virtue or supply motives in the absence of more specific virtues, but they do not alone make men good; and virtues may incline men to social consciousness, but they do not in all states make men politically effective. Ethics and politics approximate to each other only in the ideal case, for in the perfect state the good citizen would coincide with the good man.'6 i6 Politics iii. 5. I278a40: "As to the question whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good citizen, the considerations already adduced prove that in some states the good man and the good citizen are the same, and in others different. When they are the same it is not every citizen who is a good man, but only the statesman and those who have or may have, alone or in conjunction with others, the conduct of public affairs." Ibid. I3. I 283b42:
"And a citizen is one who shares in governing and being governed. He differs under different forms of government, but in the best state he is one who is able and willing to be governed and to govern with a view to the life of virtue." Ibid. iv. 7. I293b5: "In the perfect state the good man is absolutely the same as the good citizen; whereas in other states the good citizen is only good relatively to his own form of government." The importance of this limiting case in which moral and political considerations coincide may be judged by the frequency with which Aristotle returns to the problem of the relation of the good man to the good citizen (cf. 
ETHICS
Political philosophy, then, has both a broad and a narrow sense. In its broad sense political philosophy includes both ethics and politics, while in its narrow sense it is limited to consideration of the associations of men in social groups in counterdistinction to ethics, which is limited to consideration of the actions and virtues of men. Political philosophy assumes priority over moral philosophy in this distinction, since it treats of ends while moral philosophy treats of means to such ends, and for the same reason it exercises, as architectonic science and art of arts, supervision over all other sciences and arts. Unless careful distinction were made between theoretic and practical sciences, there would be danger that politics usurp the functions of metaphysics (as it has indeed in some philosophies subsequent to Aristotle's), but if knowing and doing are distinguished, the supervision which politics exercises on the sciences may be examined realistically without confusion with the treatment of scientific principles in metaphysics. Politics involves supervision or control of arts and sciences in so far as they are thought relevant to the character or training of citizens; metaphysics supplies the technique for testing scientific principles to determine their adequacy to demonstrations and their appropriateness to subject matters.'7 '7 Nicomachean Ethics i. 2. I094a25:
"If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it [sc. the good] is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art and that which is most truly the master art. And politics appears to be of this nature; for it is this that ordains which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and which each class of citizens should learn and up to what point they should learn them; and we see even the most highly esteemed of capacities to fall under this, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric; now, since politics uses the rest of the sciences, and since, again, it legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from, the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man." Cf. ibid. 9. Io99b29: ". ... for we stated the end of political science to be the best end, and political science spends most of its pains on making citizens to be of a certain character, viz. good and capable of noble acts." Politics iii. I2. 1282b55:
"In all sciences and arts the end is a good, and the greatest good and in the highest degree a good in the most authoritative of all-this is the political science of which the good is justice, in other words, the common interest." These judgments are not in contradiction with the frequent statement that wisdom or first philosophy (i.e., metaphysics) is the most authori-The Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics are the two parts of a single inquiry or science; what is assumed as given in the one constitutes the problem to be solved in the other, and what is fixed and natural is found first in the individual man, then in the group, in the passions and actions which as subject to regulation by habit are the natural bases of ethics, and in the needs to be satisfied and the ends to be achieved by association which are the natural conditions of politics. The Nicomachean Ethics moves from the consideration of potentialities to ends: it begins by finding in the parts or functions of the soul distinctions which prepare for acceptable conceptions of the good, of happiness, and of activity according to virtue; but it closes, after the virtues and happiness, friendship and pleasure, have been treated, with the recognition that in practical questions knowledge is insufficient or even impossible of acquisition without the group influences of custom, rewards, and punishments which are wielded by law.
But it is difficult to get from youth up a right training for virtue if one has not been brought up under right laws; for to live temperately and hardily is not pleasant to most people, especially when they are young. For this reason their nurture and occupations should be fixed by law; for they will not be painful when they have become customary. But it is surely not enough that when they are young they should get the right nurture and attention; since they must, even when they are grown up, practise and be habituated to them, we shall need laws for this as well, and generally speaking to cover the whole of life; for most tative of the sciences or with the explicitly stated judgment that politics is not such a science. Cf. Metaphysics i. 2. 982b4: "And the science which knows to what end each thing must be done is the most authoritative of the sciences, and more authoritative than any ancillary science; and this end is the good in each class, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature. Judged by all the tests we have mentioned, then, the name in question ['Wisdom'] falls to the same science; this must be a science that investigates the first principles and causes; for the good, i.e. the end and aim, is one of the causes." Nicomachean Ethics vi. 7. I I41i8: "Therefore wisdom must be intuitive reason combined with scientific knowledge-scientific knowledge of the highest objects which has received as it were its proper completion. Of the highest objects, we say; for it would be strange to think that the art of politics, or practical wisdom, is the best knowledge, since man is not the best thing in the world." 268 ETHICS people obey necessity rather than argument, and punishments rather than the sense of what is noble.'8
The Politics, conversely, proceeds from the consideration of ends to individuals: it begins by showing that the various forms of human association are "natural" because they supply needs and achieve ends; but it closes, after the kinds of states, actual as well as ideal, have been enumerated and after the mutual influences and determinations of institutions and citizens have been examined, with the consideration of the oppositions of citizens and state and the means by which states are preserved or destroyed.'9 18 Nicomachean Ethics x. 9. II79b3I. Aristotle observes in this context that the problems involved in laws had not been examined by his predecessors, notwithstanding the interest in moral questions which he remarked as dominant among philosophers since Socrates and the detailed knowledge he displays of Plato's political theories. Cf. ibid. ii81bI3: "Now our predecessors have left the subject of legislation to us unexamined; it is perhaps best, therefore, that we should ourselves study it, and in general study the question of the constitution, in order to complete to the best of our ability our philosophy of human nature." I9 Statements about the sequence of problems treated in the Politics are rendered difficult and questionable by the uncertainties scholars have found in determining the order of books in that work. The philological grounds for those uncertainties need not be examined here, since the dialectical interrelations of the discussion of individuals in associations is not drastically affected (as a scientific demonstration might have been) by a change of order. The method which is used in the Politics is a dialectic which proceeds by analysis of wholes and parts. The state is conceived as related to lesser social groups and eventually to citizens, as a whole is related to its parts, and in this sense as form to matter. Social groups are therefore analogized to physical compounds, since the qualities and functions of the composite whole cannot be inferred simply from consideration of the qualities and functions of the simples which enter the composition (cf. Politics vii. 7. I328a2I), yet notwithstanding the disparity of part to whole or even the necessity that services which are indispensable to the state be determined by the state and imposed on citizens, the end of individuals and of state is in general the same (ibid. I5. 1334aI1i). Two possible relations of citizens to a state, therefore, call for special consideration, and all political problems fall between the extremes determined by them: at one extreme the ends of the citizens or important groups of the citizens may coincide with the ends pursued by the state, at the other extreme the ends of men may differ from those of the state, and between those extremes are ranged the innumerable examples of institutions altering the traits of citizens and men changing the organization of institutions. Scholars have tended in recent years to arrange the books of the Politics in such fashion that the discussion culminates in the former of these two possibilities, which is achieved, except for momentary accident, only in the best state. That coincidence is specific in the case of the best man and the best constitution, and it would be appropriate, therefore, that the relation of citizen and state receive its final treatment (as it does in the latter portion of Book VII and in Book VIII) in the The subject matters of the two treatises-actions and associations, virtues and constitutions-have no absolute status in exconsideration of the rearing and education of children, since these are the crucial means for establishing or preserving a perfect state. On the other hand, in the traditional order of the books, which is dialectically preferable and which is assumed in the statement to which this note is attached, the discussion culminates in differences between the ends of individuals or groups and states rather than in their coincidences. In the differentiation of various types of institutions the perfect state would be treated first (in Books VII and VIII which were formerly IV and V), then less perfect constitutions, and the inquiry would conclude with a discussion (in Book V which was formerly VIII) of revolutions and their causes, as well as the means which might be used in particular states for the preservation of their peculiar constitutions. Revolutions are explained by means of the relations of individuals to one another and to the constitution of the state. "In the first place we must assume as our starting-point that in the many forms of government which have sprung up there has always been an acknowledgement of justice and proportionate equality, although mankind fail in attaining them, as indeed I have already explained ... . All these forms of government have a kind of justice, but, tried by an absolute standard, they are faulty; and, therefore, both parties, whenever their share in the government does not accord with their preconceived ideas, stir up revolution. Those who excel in virtue have the best right of all to rebel (for they alone can with reason be deemed absolutely unequal), but then they are of all men the least inclined to do so. There is also a superiority which is claimed by men of rank; for they are thought noble because they spring from virtuous and wealthy ancestors" (ibid. v. I. 130oa25). By means of this distinction among the kinds of equality found in men as associated in states, Aristotle differentiates two kinds of revolution, the one effecting a change in the constitution of the state, the other effecting a change in the administration of the government without altering the constitution, that is to say, changes respectively in the character of the state and in the persons of the officials. In all cases revolutions arise from a disproportion of men, or more precisely from a disparity between the ends of men and those of the state. "Everywhere inequality is a cause of revolution, but an inequality in which there is no proportion-for instance, a perpetual monarch among equals; and always it is the desire of equality which rises in rebellion" (ibid. I30ob26). The treatment of revolutions and of the means of preserving states, carried out in shrewd and ingenious detail, not only forms an appropriate emphasis in which the dialectic of the Politics might be expected to eventuate, but it supplies still one more indication of the rigorously practical character of Aristotle's approach to political problems, for only the stress of circumstances has in the subsequent history of political theory brought revolutions and the preservation of states periodically (as it has in the language of current political discussions) to the center of political inquiry. In such an interpretation of the relation of the Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics, the list of problems enumerated in the last lines of the latter work, presumably for discussion in the Politics, need not be interpreted as imposing an order of discussion in the Politics, for it would be appropriate that political problems be ordered dialectically from a moral point of view in a work on ethics-and so ordered culminate in the discussion of the conditions of the perfect state-and yet require dialectical reordering in the appropriate sequence of political inquiry, since in politics the influence of institutions on individuals takes precedence over the influence of moral considerations on political ideals and operations. 270 ETHICS istence or natural sequence of change. Neither treatise follows the usual pattern of the Aristotelian sciences, which is determined by the search for essential or scientific definitions and natural causes. Habits and constitutions are defined and differentiated from each other by reference to "natural" bases from which criteria of practical appropriateness, effectiveness, and value are derived to serve as genera and differential. Such natural bases are found for moral inquiry in the actions and passions of the mind, since the virtues are then defined by means of the habits which regulate or perfect human powers and passions. Comparable "natural" bases are found for politics in the traits and functions of men and classes of men in association, since constitutions and citizens are then distinguished and classified by means of the interrelations of smaller within larger groups. The virtues which envisage ends are defined relative to the natural potentialities which may be treated as their matter; institutions which are inaugurated to supply the needs of men are defined relative to the ends they are designed to achieve. The natural bases of ethics are material or psychological potentialities; the natural bases of politics are ideal ends. For this reason, laws may, in the absence of virtues, supply an end which substitutes the single virtue of justice for all the virtues; and virtue may, in the absence of equality and proportion in the state, restore a balance by the revolutionary institution of a better-grounded state. Neither men nor states, neither citizens nor associations, are absolute in substance, fixed in quality, or specifically determined in evolution. Either may effect the alteration of the other, and inquiry concerning either is possible only if the other is held fixed for the purposes of that investigation. For moral inquiry "nature" is found in the powers and passions which may be regulated according to rational principles; for political inquiry "nature" is found in the powers by which citizens balance and supplement one another for the promotion of a common good life in the constitution of states.
As a result of this peculiarity of the subject matter of the practical sciences and of the definitions appropriate to that subject matter, even the dialectical statement of the problem in those sciences differs from the similar statement of problems in the theoretic sciences. Aristotle usually sets forth fundamental problems concerning principles, definitions, and causes in physics, psychology, or metaphysics, by a preliminary dialectical examination of the doctrines of other philosophers or even of common opinion, and after the juxtapositions and refutations, partial or total, of those opinions he returns to make a fresh start in his own solution of the problems adumbrated. When the nature of the good is approached in the same fashion in the opening book of the Nicomachean Ethics, however, general agreement is found in the statement of the solution, from which Aristotle does not dissent, but not in any of the elements which enter into the statement of the problems; and difficulties arise precisely in interpreting the term by which the good is to be defined-and political science is itself involved as a subject of that ambiguity, not merely as the science which treats itrather than in enumeration of the properties or principles to be included in the definition.
Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise.20
The character of the problem may be judged from the fact that for Aristotle "good" is an ambiguous term2I and figures, therefore, as one of the most frequently recurrent examples in the dialectical discussions of the Topics. Philosophers as well as the run of people define happiness by reference to an end to which action is directed, most people identifying it with the 272 ETHICS attainment of simple and obvious objectives, like pleasure, wealth, or honor, philosophers seeking some self-subsistent cause of the goodness of all things. Aristotle's refutation, therefore, turns wholly on showing those identifications to be erroneous (although he recognizes in his customary fashion that there must be some truth in these opinions) ,22 because the simple objectives of most men are inadequate, while the good has no claim to the independent existence attributed to it by Platonists and like-minded philosophers. Since his own definition requires reference to virtue, the ambiguity of the terms "good" and "happiness" cannot be supposed to be wholly removed until the end of the treatise, and indeed happiness is reserved to be the last subject discussed.
The method of inquiry in ethics is precisely the reverse of the method of that branch of the Aristotelian physics which is closest to ethics in that it too treats of the actions of man. In the De anima Aristotle refutes earlier definitions of the soul based on functions or properties and proceeds then, in the establishment of his own definition, to investigate in turn the nutritive, sensitive, and intellectual powers by examining first the objects on which those powers are exercised, determining from the objects the acts directed to such objects, and finally from the acts the peculiarities of the powers exercised in such acts. In the Nicomachean Ethics, on the contrary, he refutes definitions of happiness based on a choice of specific ends and proceeds then, in giving content to his own conception of happiness, to investigate the habits which accord with rational rules to regulate human powers otherwise oriented indeterminately to actions, good or bad. Happiness is activity of a certain kind, not an activity to a certain end; it is activity in accordance with virtue, and the kinds of virtue are determined, not by a "natural" good to which they are directed, nor by a "natural" action in which they are found, but by the powers, rational and irrational, distinguishable in the soul The moral and intellectual virtues are first differentiated, then, by means of psychological powers, but they are defined by means of their manner and criteria of activity, and their definitions are therefore distinct one from the other not only in form but also in the dialectical methods by which they are established. The moral virtues are habits which regulate those activities of the irrational part of the soul which, though capricious and irregular, are susceptible to the influence of persuasion and capable of submission to a rational principle. They apply, consequently, only to the functions of the soul which involve appetite and desire, for not all irrational activities-as, for example, the vegetative functions-can be made to share in a rational principle. The intellectual virtues are habits which perfect the activities of the rational part of the soul. They are concerned, therefore, with the perception and formulation of regularities and laws, sometimes for application in the regulation of life and techniques, sometimes to no other end than the acquisition and contemplation of truth. Moral and intellectual virtues differ thus both in nature and in mode of acquisition, for moral virtues are developed by habituation and discipline, intellectual virtues by practice, study, and instruction. Although both are "habits," their differences make necessary different methods of establishing their definitions and determining their kinds. The actions in which the moral virtues eventuate are to be judged and defined only relative to the experiences and character from which they spring, whereas the activities determined by the intellectual virtues tend to ends which must be considered apart from the peculiarities of individual minds. The problems of ethics shift therefore between two foci, the individual abilities and situations which are materials for the moral virtues and subjects for deliberation and choice and the rational rules according to which such deliberations may proceed and which are subjects for the intellectual virtues.
The definition of the moral virtues is a dialectical construction determined in part by scientific materials borrowed from 274 ETHICS psychology, in part by analogies suggested by art and nature, and in part by criteria elaborated by the intellectual virtues. The genus of the moral virtues is determined by a dialectical choice among the three things in the soul: they are not passions or faculties but habits. Their differentia is determined in two fashions, relative to the person of the agent and relative to rational criteria. For the first, Aristotle draws an analogy from natural and artistic excellence to moral excellence, inferring that virtue as habit disposes one to choose in the right way among actions and passions, and that the right way involves a mean between extremes. Such a mean proportion may be determined in action by habit without explicit knowledge, but if it is to be stated it is made a rational rule and therefore subject in its second formulation to an intellectual virtue. The final definition therefore bears only a dialectical likness to a scientific definition by genus and differentia: "Virtue, then, is a habit concerned with choice (6"ls wpoaLpErLK), lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the prudent man would determine it."24 In its construction the four causes, which are important also in determining the methods of metaphysics and physics, are all discernible. Physical definitions usually specify two of the causes, the matter and some formal determination of the matter.25 The virtues, however, are not themselves actions but are oriented to actions: the genus of virtue is therefore found in the efficient cause of actions, namely, habit concerned with choice, and the differentia supplies the criteria for such action stated either in the formal considerations of a proportion or in the final determinations of a rational rule. Moreover, this definition of the moral virtues in turn serves as a genus,26 and further specifications are made by introducing into the proportion the material causes-i.e., the passions and actions with which the virtues are concerned-to determine the Of the three, namely, sensation, reason, and desire, the latter two supply the final cause toward which choice operates. "The principle of action-its efficient, not its final cause-is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning for the sake of some end. "27 The discussion of the intellectual virtues therefore supplements the discussion of the moral virtues, for every virtue both brings into good condition the thing itself of which it is the virtue and causes the work of that thing to be well done, and the intellectual virtues treat of excellences relative to the action or work by turning attention to the right rule and standard.28 As the soul itself is divided into two parts, rational and irrational, so the rational part is divided into two parts, one by which we contemplate things whose principles are invariable, another by which we contemplate variable things. Since moral virtue is a habit concerned with choice and therefore involved in variable things, it depends, like good choice, on the coincidence of true reasoning and right desire: truth in such applications is the object of the calculative part of the soul. Virtue in the scientific part of the soul, since it is not thus involved in variability, coincides with truth. Aristotle offers no general definition of the intellectual virtues apart from observing that they are ways in which the soul has truth by affirmation and negation :29 instead the definition of the first intellectual virtue, sci-27 Ibid. Vi and continuously cognizant of the responsibilities and ends of political action, but in the sense that he is incapable of existence and of a good life without the benefits of political associations.
The two directions in which "nature" is sought in ethics and in politics, respectively, in material potentialities and in ends, are discernible even in the criticisms by which Aristotle undertakes to refute Plato in those two sciences. In the Nicomtachean Ethics Socrates is criticized for reducing the virtues to knowledge, while the Platonists are criticized for separating action and end in the doctrine of a self-subsistent good which is inadequate to the multiplicity of goods and ineffective to aid in their pursuit;45 multiplicity of being and practicability of application are both achieved, according to Aristotle, by seeking the natural basis of virtues in actions and passions. In the Politics Socrates and Plato are criticized for reducing all forms of association and all kinds of rule to one, for trying to unify the state by making it a kind of family and by making all citizens the same;46 efficacy of appeal to social motivation depends, according to Aristotle, on the distinction of the state from other forms of association, and the natural bases for that distinction can be found only in the multiplicity of ends achieved by association. In moral and political philosophy, as in physics and metaphysics, multiplicity of classifications and pluralism of kinds are essential to Aristotle's solution of philosophic problems.
Since the state is a whole and composite, it can be analyzed, on the analogy of natural composite bodies and organic compounds, by considering its parts and its ends: the constituent parts of the state are the citizens;47 the ends of states are to be found in their natures or constitutions, which in turn are to be determined by the manner and proportion in which the parts of states are combined. Single-minded pursuit of the good, however, is rare if not unexampled in political history, and the philosophic discussion of the perfect state would be impractical if its precepts were treated as rules to be followed literally rather than as the limiting case in which all consideration of particular and actual conditions may be omitted. To supplement such consideration in terms of the best as the limit to political development, states must also be differentiated into the varieties of their kinds, not merely as good or bad in general, but as well or poorly suitedwhether good or bad on abstract standards-to the situations, characters, educations, and employments of citizens. Moreover, to treat the appropriateness of political institutions to particular situations, the various functions of the state must be differentiated as well as the relevant traits of its citizens. The analysis of the best state, which resulted from the consideration of final causes suited to the realization of the best potentialities of man, is supplemented therefore, by a second analysis, not of what is best in the abstract, but of what is best under given circumstances. That change of emphasis is made possible by consideration of the material instead of the final causes of states, as they are found in the characters of possible or actual citizen bodies, much as a similar reorientation in the problems of the physical sciences was achieved by the use of material causes in the De caelo. The realizable potentialities of any actual group of men fall short of the ideal potentialities of man, and the bad as well as the good forms of constitutions are treated in terms 50 The double classification is stated in Book III; the characteristics of the best state, its citizens, and their education are treated in Books VII and VIII. In the traditional order of books, as contrasted to the recent scholarly ordering which separates them, they follow as Books III, IV, and V. The traditional order is followed throughout in the application of the causes to the problems of the Politics that follows. the customary six states. It is unnecessary, since monarchy and aristocracy are good without qualification, to take them up again in the second consideration of states which are the best under particular circumstances, and they are therefore omitted in the second analysis, while the remaining four are treated in detail.53 The claims of polity and tyranny to consideration, however, are entirely due to their defensibility, in so far as they are defensible, under the press of particular situations, for they are not truly constitutions, polity being a fusion of oligarchy and democracy, and tyranny being either indistinguishable from monarchy or no form of government.54 They have no place, therefore, in the consideration of what is best in states in general, which depends on formal perfections of organization in the state treated so far as possible apart from any consideration of occasional outstanding virtues or possible degradations of citizens. Only two kinds of states-democracies and oligarchies-remain for consideration under this third head, and they are treated, not in terms of ends or in terms of distinctions in classes of citizens, but in terms of common qualities shared by citizens and in terms of proportions in the exercise of the three functions of the state.55
The problems of politics involve, finally, in addition to questions of structure and purpose or questions of what is best in the abstract or in this particular case or in general, questions of generation, change, and destruction, questions concerning how a state of any given kind may be initiated and set up, how it may be continued once established, and how it may be overthrown. The pursuit of inquiry into efficient causes, which alone are suited to solve problems of generation, destruction, or preservation, led Aristotle to his shrewd analysis of revolutions, of the means by which to foment movements that lead to changes in a constitution, the devices by which to thwart them, and the precautions to be taken against them. 
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ETHICS treating man as a part of institutions organized in view of ends, as ethics supplements politics by treating ends in terms of the potentialities, abilities, and reasons of men. The one, ethics, adapts efficient causes of action to situations, rules, and ends; the other, politics, adapts ends to kinds of citizens, forms of government, and modes of political action. The Nicomachean Ethics proceeds from the habits to the ends of moral activity and analyzes the ways in which the potentialities of human action may be realized to their fullest, first in habits concerned with choice, then in habits concerned with reason and rules, and finally in activities and most particularly in the activity which is the end of man, happiness. The Politics proceeds from the ends of states and associations conceived as wholes to the activities, social and antisocial, of men who make up the state, and analyzes the ways in which those ends may themselves determine the form of a state, or how the form may be determined to particular conditions, or how the form may be treated apart from ends or conditions, or how changes occur from one form to another. The pattern of causes which governs these analyses is the contribution of metaphysics to moral and political philosophy. But more important than the source are the consequences of that conception of causes in moral and political philosophy, for the same four causes operate in Aristotle's treatment of physics, but with this difference, that powers are determined uniquely to ends in natural things and natural change, while moral actions are determined by habits which involve choice, and political associations and combinations are determined at least in part by men's conception of the good. The numerous acceptable analogies between physics, on the one hand, and ethics and politics, on the other, have frequently tempted philosophers to deny these differences. In the philosophy of Aristotle, however, they mark the crucial point at which practical sciences are distinguished from theoretical-as the analogies between physics and politics mark the difference between the practical sciences and the arts-for the indeterminacy of habit and choice which stands between human powers and actions make necessary in politics and ethics a dialectical method which unites the subject matters of the two practical sciences in contrast to the scientifically discriminated subjects treated by scientific methods in the physical sciences. The influence which Aristotle's moral and political theories have had in later ages has followed a tortuous path determined largely by the fact that Aristotle's cautious discrimination of the practical sciences from the arts and the theoretic sciences is rarely part of the influence he exercises, but instead some of the broad analogies-criticized by Aristotle in the doctrines of Socrates and Plato-by which doing is reduced to knowing and both are identified with making, have controlled the interpretation of Aristotle's doctrines. The influence of the Aristotelian ethics has been limited largely to the repetition in uncongenial contexts, usually traceable to Platonic sources, of his wise sayings concerning the virtues, choice, deliberation, free-will, friendship, prudence, wisdom, pleasure, happiness. Much of the language in which ethics and moral problems are discussed still bears an Aristotelian impress, but the particularity which his constant insistence on choice and the efficient causes of action brought to his words has been lost in the generality which has come into ethics by emphasis on forms, actions, and ends. During the Christian Middle Ages the ethics of Aristotle was introduced into a moral theory built on eternal goods and divine love which were often described in terms borrowed from Plato.57
